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Daniel Y. Little and Friedrich T. Sommer
Abstract—Although exploratory behaviors are ubiquitous in the animal kingdom, their computational underpinnings are still largely
unknown. Behavioral Psychology has identified learning as a primary drive underlying many exploratory behaviors. Exploration is seen
as a means for an animal to gather sensory data useful for reducing its ignorance about the environment. While related problems have
been addressed in Data Mining and Reinforcement Learning, the computational modeling of learning-driven exploration by embodied
agents is largely unrepresented.
Here, we propose a computational theory for learning-driven exploration based on the concept of missing information that allows an
agent to identify informative actions using Bayesian inference. We demonstrate that when embodiment constraints are high, agents
must actively coordinate their actions to learn efficiently. Compared to earlier approaches, our exploration policy yields more efficient
learning across a range of worlds with diverse structures. The improved learning in turn affords greater success in general tasks
including navigation and reward gathering. We conclude by discussing how the proposed theory relates to previous information-
theoretic objectives of behavior, such as predictive information and the free energy principle, and how it might contribute to a general
theory of exploratory behavior.
Index Terms—Knowledge acquisition, Information theory, Control theory, Machine learning, Psychology, Computational neuroscience.
F
1 INTRODUCTION
E XPLORATORY behaviors have been observed andstudied in diverse species across the animal king-
dom. As one example, approach and investigation of
novel stimuli have been studied in vertebrates ranging
from fish to birds, reptiles, and mammals [21], [40],
[41], [60], [68], [75]. As another, open field and maze
experimental paradigms for studying locomotive explo-
ration in mice and rats have recently been adapted to
behavioral studies in zebrafish [64], [65]. Indeed, ex-
ploratory behaviors have even been described across a
range of invertebrates [12], [26], [31], [52]. The prevalence
of exploratory behaviors across animal species suggests a
fundamental evolutionary advantage, largely believed to
derive from the utility of information acquired through
such behaviors [33], [50], [51], [55], [56].
Computational models of exploratory behavior, de-
veloped predominantly in the field of Reinforcement
Learning (RL), have largely focused on the role of explo-
ration in the acquisition of external rewards [1], [7], [32],
[34], [69], [70], [71]. An agent that strictly maximizes the
acquisition of known rewards might fall short in finding
new, previously unknown, sources of reward. Reward
maximization therefore requires balancing between di-
rected harvesting of known rewards (exploitation) and
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the search for new rewards (exploration) [1], [7], [32],
[34], [58], [71]. The emphasis in the RL literature on
reward acquisition, however, stands in contrast to the
dominant psychological theories of exploration. Quoting
D. E. Berlyne, a pioneer in the psychology of exploration:
As knowledge accumulated about the condi-
tions that govern exploratory behavior and
about how quickly it appears after birth, it
seemed less and less likely that this behavior
could be derivative of hunger, thirst, sexual
appetite, pain, fear of pain, and the like, or
that stimuli sought through exploration are wel-
comed because they have previously accompa-
nied satisfaction of these drives. [11]
Berlyne further suggested “the most acute motivational
problems . . . are those in which the perceptual and
intellectual activities are engaged in for their own sake
and not simply as aids to handle practical problems”
[10]. In fact, a consensus has emerged in behavioral
psychology that learning represents the primary drive of
exploratory behaviors [2], [37], [52], [62]. To address this
gap between computational modeling and behavioral
psychology, we introduce here a mathematical frame-
work for studying how behavior effects learning and
develop a novel model of learning-driven exploration.
In Computational Neuroscience, machine learning
techniques have been successfully applied towards mod-
eling how the brain might learn the structure underly-
ing sensory signals, e.g., [15], [16], [18], [36], [47], [54],
[59]. Generally, these methods focus on passive learning
where the learning system can not directly effect the
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2sensory input it receives. Exploration, in contrast, is
inherently active, and can only occur in the context of a
closed-action perception loop. Learning in closed action-
perception loops differs from passive learning in two
important aspects [22]. First, a learning agent’s internal
model of the world must keep track of how actions
change the sensory input. Sensorimotor contingencies,
such as the way visual scenes change as we shift our
gaze or move our head, must be taken into account to
properly attribute changes in sensory signals to their
causes. This is perhaps reflected in neuroanatomy where
tight sensory-motor integration has been reported at all
levels of the brain [23], [24]. Though often taken for
granted, sensor-motor contingencies must actually be
learned during the course of development as is elo-
quently expressed in the explorative behaviors of young
infants (e.g., grasping and manipulating objects during
proprioceptive exploration or bringing them into visual
view during intermodal exploration) [45], [48], [57].
The second crucial aspect of learning in a closed
action-perception loop is that actions direct the acqui-
sition of sensory data. To discover what is inside an
unfamiliar box, a curious child must open it. To learn
about the world, scientists perform experiments. Direct-
ing the acquisition of data is particularly important for
embodied agents whose actuators and sensors are phys-
ically confined. Since the most informative data may not
always be accessible to a physical sensor, embodiment
may constrain an exploring agent and require that it
coordinates its actions to retrieve useful data.
In the model we propose here, an agent moving
between discrete states in a world has to learn how its ac-
tions influence its state transitions. The underlying tran-
sition dynamics are governed by a Controllable Markov
Chain (CMC). Within this simple framework, various
utility functions for guiding exploratory behaviors will
be studied, as well as several methods for coordinating
actions over time. The different exploratory strategies are
compared in their rate of learning.
2 MODEL
2.1 Mathematical framework for embodied active
learning
Controllable Markov chains (CMCs) are a simple extension
of Markov chains that incorporate a control variable for
switching between different transition distributions [19].
Formally, a CMC is a 3-tuple (S,A,Θ) where:
• S is a finite set of the possible states of the system
(for example, the possible location of an agent in its
world). N = |S|
• A is a finite set of the possible control values, i.e.,
the actions the agent can choose. M = |A|
• Θ is a 3-dimensional CMC kernel describing the
probability of transitions between states given an
action (for example, the probability an agent moves
from state s to state s’ when it chooses action a):
pa,s(s
′|Θ) = Θa,s,s′ (1)∑
s′
Θa,s,s′ = 1
For any fixed action, Θa,:,: is a (two-dimensional)
stochastic matrix describing a Markov process. Each
column in this matrix Θa,s,: defines a transition distri-
bution which is a categorical (finite discrete) distribution
specifying the likelihoods for the next state.
The CMC provides a simple mathematical framework
for modeling exploration in embodied action-perception
loops. At every time step, an exploring agent is allowed
to freely select any action a ∈ A. The learning task of the
exploring agent is to build from observed transitions an
estimate, the internal model Θ̂, of the true CMC kernel,
the world Θ. We assume that the explorer begins with
limited information about the world in the form of a
prior and must improve its estimate by acting in the
world and gathering observations. The states can be
directly observed by the agent, i.e. the system is not
hidden. In the CMC framework, an agent’s immediate
ability to interact with and observe the world is limited
by the current state. This restriction models the embod-
iment of the agent. To ameliorate the myopia imparted
by its embodiment, an agent can coordinate its actions
over time. Our primary question is how action policies
can optimize the speed and efficiency of learning in
embodied action-perception loops.
2.2 Information-theoretic assessment of learning
To assess an agent’s success towards learning, we de-
termine the missing information IM in its internal model
(as proposed by Pfaffelhuber [49]). We do this by first
calculating the Kullback-Leibler (KL) divergence of the
internal model from the world for each transition distri-
bution:
DKL(Θa,s,: ‖ Θ̂s,a,:) :=
N∑
s′=1
Θs,a,s′ log2
(
Θs,a,s′
Θ̂s,a,s′
)
The KL-divergence can be interpreted as the expected
amount of information in bits, lost when observations
(following the true distribution) are communicated using
an encoding scheme optimized for the estimated distri-
bution [13]. The loss is large when the two distributions
differ greatly and zero when they are identical. The
missing information is then calculated as the sum of the
KL-divergences for each transition distribution:
IM(Θ ‖ Θ̂) :=
∑
s∈S,a∈A
DKL(Θs,a,:||Θ̂s,a,:) (2)
We will use missing information (2) to assess learning
and to compare the performance of different explorative
strategies. Steeper decreases in missing information over
time represent faster learning and thus more efficient
explorative strategies. Table 1 has been included as a
reference guide for the various measures discussed in
this manuscript for assessing or guiding exploration.
3TABLE 1
Table of Information Measures
Name used here, Abbreviation (Equation Number) Name used in [Reference] Mathematical expression
Missing Information, IM (2) Missing Information [49]
∑
s∈S,a∈A
DKL(Θs,a,:||Θ̂s,a,:)
Information Gain, IG (10) IM(Θ̂)− IM(Θ̂a,s,s
∗
)
Predicted Information Gain, PIG (13) Information Gain [44] E
s∗|a,s,~da,s
[
DKL(Θ̂a,s,:||Θ̂a,s,s
∗
a,s,: )
]
Posterior Expected Information Gain, PEIG (18) KL−Divergence [67] or Surprise [29]
∑
s∈S,a∈A
DKL(Θ̂
past
a,s,: ‖ Θ̂currenta,s,: )
Predicted Mode Change, PMC (19) Probability Gain [44]
∑
s∗
Θ̂a,s,s∗
[
max
s′
Θ̂a,s,s
∗
a,s,s′ −maxs′ Θ̂a,s,s′
]
Predicted L1 Change, PLC (20) Impact [44]
∑
s∗
Θ̂s,a,s∗
[
1
N
∑
s′
∣∣∣Θ̂a,s,s∗a,s,s′ − Θ̂a,s,s′ ∣∣∣
]
2.3 Bayesian inference learning in an agent
During exploration, a learning agent will gather data in
the form of experienced state transitions. At every time
step, it can update its internal model Θ̂ with its last
observation.
Assuming the transition probabilities are drawn from
a prior distribution f (a distribution over CMC kernels),
and letting ~d be the history of observed transitions, the
Bayesian estimate Θ̂s,a,s′ for the probability of transi-
tioning to state s′ from state s under action a is given
by:
Θ̂a,s,s′ : = pa,s(s
′|~d)
=
∫
Θ
pa,s(s
′,Θ|~d)dΘ
=
∫
Θ
pa,s(s
′|Θ, ~d)f(Θ|~d)dΘ
=
∫
Θ
pa,s(s
′|Θ)f(Θ|~d)dΘ
=
∫
Θ
Θa,s,s′f(Θ|~d)dΘ
= EΘ[Θa,s,s′ |~d] := EΘ|~d[Θa,s,s′ ] (3)
For discrete priors the above integrals would be replaced
with summations. At the beginning of exploration, when
the history ~d is empty, f(Θ|~d) is simply the prior f(Θ).
Equation (3) demonstrates that the Bayesian estimate
is equivalent to the expected value of the true CMC
kernel given the data. If we further assume that each
transition distribution Θa,s,: is independently drawn
from the marginals fa,s of the distribution f and we
let ~da,s be the history of state transitions experienced
when taking action a in state s, (3) simplifies to the
independent estimation of each transition distribution:
Θ̂a,s,s′ =
∫
Θ
Θa,s,s′f(Θ|~d)dΘ
=
∫
Θa,s,:
Θa,s,s′fa,s(Θa,s,:|~da,s)dΘa,s,:
= EΘa,s,:|~da,s [Θa,s,s′ ] (4)
In the following theorem, we demonstrate that the
Bayesian estimator minimizes the expected missing in-
formation and thus is the best estimate under our objec-
tive function (2).
Theorem 1: Let Θ and Φ be CMC kernels. Θ describes
the ground truth environment generated from a prior
distribution. Φ is any internal model of the agent. Then
the expected missing information between Θ and an
internal model Φ, given data ~d, is minimized by the
Bayesian estimate Θ̂:
Θ̂ = arg min
Φ
EΘ|~d [IM(Θ ‖ Φ)] (5)
Proof: Since missing information is simply the sum
of the KL-divergence for each transition kernel (2), min-
imizing missing information is equivalent to indepen-
dently minimizing these KL-divergences:
arg min
Φa,s,:
EΘa,s,:|~d [DKL (Θa,s,: ‖ Φa,s,:)]
= arg min
Φa,s,:
EΘa,s,:|~d
[∑
s′
Θa,s,s′ log2
(
Θa,s,s′
Φa,s,s′
)]
= arg min
Φa,s,:
EΘa,s,:|~d
[∑
s′
Θa,s,s′ log2Θa,s,s′
]
−EΘa,s,:|~d
[∑
s′
Θa,s,s′ log2Φa,s,s′
]
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a=‘up’
a=‘left’
Fig. 1. Example maze. The 36 states correspond to
rooms in a maze. The 4 actions correspond to noisy
translations in the cardinal directions. Two transition distri-
butions are depicted, each by a set of 4 arrows emanating
from their starting state. Flat-headed arrows represent
translations into walls, resulting in staying in the same
room. Dashed arrows represent translation into a portal
(blue lines) leading to the base state (blue target). The
shading of an arrow indicates the probability of the transi-
tion (darker color represents higher probability).
= arg min
Φa,s,:
− EΘa,s,:|~d
[∑
s′
Θa,s,s′ log2Φa,s,s′
]
= arg min
Φa,s,:
−
∑
s′
EΘa,s,:|~d [Θa,s,s′ ] log2Φa,s,s′
= arg min
Φa,s,:
H
[
EΘa,s,:|~d [Θa,s,:] ;Φa,s,:
]
Here H[θ;φ] denotes the cross-entropy [13]. Then, by
Gibb’s inequality [13] we conclude:
arg min
Φa,s,:
H
[
EΘa,s,:|~d [Θa,s,:] ;Φa,s,:
]
= EΘa,s,:|~d [Θa,s,:]
= Θ̂a,s,:(~d)
The analytical form for the Bayesian estimate will de-
pend on the prior. In the following section, we introduce
three classes of CMCs which will be considered in this
study and specify the Bayesian estimates for each.
2.4 Three test environments for studying explo-
ration
In the course of exploration, the data an agent accumu-
lates will depend on both its behavioral strategy as well
as the world structure. Studying diverse environments,
i.e., CMCs that differ greatly in structure, will help us
to investigate how world structure effects the relative
performance of different exploratory strategies and to
identify action policies that produce efficient learning
under broad conditions.
The three different classes of test environments to be
investigated will be called Dense Worlds, Mazes, and 1-
2-3 Worlds. For each class, random CMCs are generated
by drawing the transition distributions from specific dis-
tributions. These generative distributions are also given
to the agents as priors for performing Bayesian inference.
1) Dense Worlds correspond to complete directed prob-
ability graphs with N = 10 states and M = 4 actions.
Each transition distribution is independently drawn
from a Dirichlet distribution:
Θs,a,,: ∼ Dir(1) :=
∏
s′Θs,a,s′
α−1
B(α)
(6)
B(α) :=
Γ(α)N
Γ(Nα)
Γ(α) :=
∫ ∞
0
tα−1e−tdt
The Dirichlet distribution is the conjugate prior of the
categorical distribution (1) and thus a natural distri-
bution for generating CMCs. It is parametrized by a
concentration factor α that determines how much weight
in the Dirichlet distribution is centered at the midpoint
of the simplex, the space of all possible transition dis-
tributions. The midpoint corresponds to the uniform
categorical distribution. For Dense Worlds, we use a con-
centration parameter α = 1 which results in a uniform
distribution over the simplex. An example is depicted
graphically in Fig. S1.
The Bayesian estimate for Dense Worlds has the fol-
lowing closed-form expression:
Θ̂a,s,s′ =
1 +
∑K
k=1 δs′,~da,s[k]
K +N
(7)
where K is the length of the history ~da,s and δx,y is the
Kronecker delta (i.e. δx,y is 1 if x = y and 0 otherwise).
Equation (7) reveals that the Bayesian estimate is sim-
ply the relative frequencies of the observed data with
the addition of one fictitious count per transition. The
incorporation of this fictitious observation is referred to
as Laplace smoothing and is often performed to avoid
over-fitting [39]. The derivation of Laplace smoothing
from Bayesian inference over a Dirichlet prior is a well
known result [38].
2) Mazes consist of N = 36 states corresponding
to rooms in a randomly generated 6 by 6 maze and
M = 4 actions corresponding to noisy translations, each
biased towards one of the four cardinal directions ”up”,
”down”, ”left” and ”right”. An example is depicted in
Fig. 1. Walking into a wall causes the agent to remain in
its current location. There are 30 transporters randomly
distributed amongst the walls which lead to a base
state. Each maze has a single, randomly chosen base
state (concentric rings in Fig. 1). All transitions that
do not correspond to a single translation are assigned
a probability of zero. The non-zero probabilities are
drawn from a Dirichlet distribution with concentration
parameter α = 0.25. The highest probability is assigned
5to the state corresponding to the cardinal direction of
the action. The small concentration parameter distributes
more probability weight in the corners of the simplex
corresponding to deterministic transitions. This results in
Maze transitions have strong biases towards an actions
associated cardinal direction.
Agents in Mazes must estimate the non-zero transi-
tions using the Dirichlet prior without knowledge of
each action’s assigned cardinal direction. Similar to (7),
the Bayesian estimate for maze transitions is given by:
Θ̂a,s,s′ =
0.25 +
∑K
k=1 δs′,~da,s[k]
K + 0.25 ·Na,s (8)
where Na,s is the number of non-zero probability states
in the transition distribution Θa,s,:. As with Dense
Worlds, the Bayesian estimate (8) for mazes is a Laplace
smoothed histogram.
3) 1-2-3 Worlds consists of N = 20 states and M = 3
actions. In a given state, action a = 1 moves the agent
deterministically to a single target state, action a = 2
brings the agent with probability 0.5 to one of two
possible target states, and action a = 3 brings the
agent with probability 0.333 to one of 3 potential target
states. The target states are randomly and independently
selected for each action taken in each state. To create an
absorbing state, the probability that state 1 is among the
targets of action a is set to 1 − 0.75a. The probability
for all other states to be selected as targets is uniform.
Explicitly, letting Ωa be the set of all admissible transition
distributions for action a:
Ωa := {θ ∈ IRN |
∑
s′
θs′ = 1 and θs′ ∈ {0, 1
a
}∀s′}
the transition distributions are drawn from the following
distribution:
p(Θa,s,:) =

0 if Θa,s,: /∈ Ωa
1− 0.75a(
N−1
a−1
) else if Θa,s,1 = 1a
1− (1− 0.75a)(
N−1
a
) otherwise
(9)
If this process results in a non ergodic CMC, it is
discarded and a new CMC is generated. A CMC as
ergodic if, for every ordered pair of states, there exist
an action policy under which an agent starting at the
first state will eventually reach the second. An example
1-2-3 Worlds is depicted in Fig. S2.
Bayesian inference in 1-2-3 Worlds differs greatly from
Mazes and Dense Worlds because of its discrete prior.
Essentially, state transitions that have been observed are
accurately estimated, while the remaining probability
weight is distributed across those states that have not yet
been experienced (preferentially to state 1 and uniformly
across other states). Explicitly, if a, s → s′ has been pre-
viously observed, then the Bayesian estimate for Θa,s,s′
is given by:
Θ̂a,s,s′ =
1
a
If a, s→ s′ has not been observed but a, s→ 1 has, then
the Bayesian estimate is given by:
Θ̂a,s,s′ =
1− |S∗|a
N − T
Here T is the number of target states that have already
been observed:
T := |{s∗ ∈ ~da,s}|
Finally, if neither a, s → s′ nor a, s → 1 have been
observed, then the Bayesian estimate is:
Θ̂a,s,s′ =

1− 0.75a
1 +
((
a−1
T
)− 1) ∗ 0.75a · 1a if s′ = 1
1−
(
T
a + Θ̂a,s,1
)
N − T − 1 otherwise
3 RESULTS
3.1 Assessing the information-theoretic value of
planned actions
The central question to be addressed is how actions
effect the learning process in embodied action-perception
loops. Ideally, actions should be chosen so that the
missing information (2) decreases as fast as possible. As
discussed in Section 2.3, the Bayesian estimate minimizes
the expected missing information. We will assume that
an agent continually updates its internal model accord-
ingly from the observations it receives. The Bayesian
estimate, however, does not indicate which action will
optimize the utility of future data. Towards this objec-
tive, an agent should try to predict the impact a new
observation will have on its missing information. We
call the decrease in missing information between two
internal models the information gain (IG). Letting Θ̂ be
a current model derived from data ~d and Θ̂a,s,s
∗
be an
updated model derived from adding an observation of
a, s→ s∗ to ~d, the information gain for this observation
is:
IG(a, s, s
∗) := IM(Θ ‖ Θ̂)− IM(Θ ‖ Θ̂a,s,s∗)
= DKL(Θa,s,: ‖ Θ̂a,s,:)−DKL(Θa,s,: ‖ Θ̂a,s,s∗a,s,: )
=
∑
s′
Θa,s,s′ log2
Θa,s,s′
Θ̂a,s,s′
−Θa,s,s′ log2
Θa,s,s′
Θ̂a,s,s
∗
a,s,s′
=
∑
s′
Θa,s,s′ log 2
Θ̂a,s,s
∗
a,s,s′
Θ̂a,s,s′
(10)
Calculating the information gained from taking action a
in state s would therefore require knowing Θ as well as
s∗. An agent can only infer former and can only know
the latter after it has executed the action. In the following
theorem, however, we derive a closed-form expression
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Fig. 2. Accuracy of predicted information gain. The average predicted information gain is plotted against the average
realized information gain. Averages are taken over 200 CMCs, N × M transition distributions, and 50 trials. Error
bars depict standard deviations (only plotted above the mean for 1-2-3 Worlds). The arrow indicates the direction of
increasing numbers of observations (top-right =none, bottom-left=19). The unity lines are drawn in gray.
for the expected information gain, which we shall call
the predicted information gain (PIG).
Theorem 2: Let Θ be a CMC kernel whose transition
distributions are independently generated from prior
distributions. If an agent is in state s and has previously
collected data ~d, then the expected information gain for
taking action a and observing the resultant state S∗ is
given by:
PIG(a, s) : = Es∗,Θ|~d[IG(a, s, s
∗)]
=
∑
s∗
Θ̂a,s,s∗DKL(Θ̂a,s,: ‖ Θ̂a,s,s∗a,s,: ) (11)
where Θ̂ is the current internal model of the agent and
Θ̂a,s,s
∗
is what the internal model would become if it
were updated with an observation s∗ resulting from a
prospective new action a.
Proof:
Es∗,Θ|~d[IG(a, s, s
∗)]
= Es∗,Θ|~d
[∑
s′
Θa,s,s′ log 2
(
Θ̂a,s,s
∗
a,s,s′
Θ̂a,s,s′
)]
= Es∗,Θa,s,:|~da,s
[∑
s′
Θa,s,s′ log 2
(
Θ̂a,s,s
∗
a,s,s′
Θ̂a,s,s′
)]
= Es∗|~da,s
[
EΘ|~da,s,s∗
[∑
s′
Θa,s,s′ log 2
(
Θ̂a,s,s
∗
a,s,s′
Θ̂a,s,s′
)]]
= Es∗|~da,s
[∑
s′
EΘ|~da,s,s∗ [Θa,s,s′ ] log 2
(
Θ̂a,s,s
∗
a,s,s′
Θ̂a,s,s′
)]
= Es∗|~da,s
[∑
s′
Θ̂a,s,s
∗
a,s,s′ log2
(
Θ̂a,s,s
∗
a,s,s′
Θ̂a,s,s′
)]
= Es∗|~da,s
[
DKL(Θ̂a,s,: ‖ Θ̂a,s,s∗a,s,: )
]
=
∑
s∗
p(s∗|~da,s)DKL(Θ̂a,s,: ‖ Θ̂a,s,s∗a,s,: )
=
∑
s∗
Θ̂a,s,s∗DKL(Θ̂a,s,: ‖ Θ̂a,s,s∗a,s,: )
Notice, (11) can be computed from previously col-
lected data alone. For each class of environments, Fig. 2
compares the average PIG with the average realized
information gain as successive observation are drawn
from a transition distribution and used to update a
Bayesian estimate. In accordance with Theorem 2, in all
three environments PIG accurately predicts the average
information gain. Thus, theoretically and empirically,
PIG represents an accurate estimate of the average gains
towards the learning objective functions that an agent
can expect to receive for taking a planned action in a
particular state.
Interestingly, the equation for computing PIG, RHS
of (11), has been previously considered in the field of
psychology, where it was applied to describe human
behavior during hypothesis testing [35], [44], [46]. To
our knowledge, however, its equality to the expected
decrease in missing information (Theorem 2) has not
been previously shown.
3.2 Control learners: unembodied and random ac-
tion
During exploration, an embodied agent can choose its
action but is bound to the state that resulted from its
last transition. A simple exploratory strategy would be
to always select actions uniformly randomly. We will use
such a random action strategy as a baseline control for
learning performance representing a naive explorer.
In contrast to embodied agents, one can also consider
an unembodied agent that is allowed to arbitrarily re-
locate to a new state before taking an action. For an
unembodied agent, optimization of learning becomes
much simpler as it decomposes into an independent
sampling problem [49]. Since the PIG for each transition
distribution decreases monotonically over successive ob-
servations (Fig. 2), learning by an unembodied agent can
be optimized by always sampling from the state and
action pair with the highest PIG. Thus, learning can be
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Fig. 3. Learning curves for control strategies. The average missing information is plotted over exploration time for the
unembodied positive control and random action baseline control. Standard errors are plotted as dotted lines above
and below learning curves. (n=200)
optimized in a greedy fashion:
(a, s)Unemb. := arg max
(a,s)
PIG(a, s) (12)
The learning curves of the unembodied agent will serve
here as a positive control as it represents an upper bound
for the performance of embodied agents.
An initial comparison between random action and
the unembodied control highlights a notable difference
among the three classes of environments (Fig. 3). Specif-
ically, the performance margin between the two controls
is significant in Mazes and 1-2-3 Worlds (p < 0.001),
but not in Dense Worlds (p > 0.01). The significance
was assessed by post-hoc analysis of Friedman’s test
[25] comparing the areas under the two learning curves.
Despite using a naive strategy, the random actor is
essentially reaching maximum performance in Dense
Worlds, suggesting that exploration of this environment
is fairly easy. The difference in performance between
random action and the unembodied control offers an ini-
tial insight into the constraints experienced by embodied
agents. A directed exploration strategy may help bridge
this gap.
3.3 Exploration strategies based on PIG
Given that PIG can be computed by an agent using only
the data it has already collected (along with its prior), we
wondered whether it could be used as a utility function
to guide exploration. Since greedy maximization of PIG
is optimal for the unembodied agent, one might con-
sider a similar greedy strategy for an embodied agent
(PIG(greedy)). The key difference would be that the
embodied agent can only select its action but not its
current state:
aPIG(greedy) := arg max
a
PIG(a, s) (13)
The performance comparison between PIG(greedy) (13)
and the unembodied control (12) is of particular inter-
est because the two strategies differ only in that one
is embodied but the other is not. Thus differences of
their performance reflect the embodiment constraint on
learning. As shown in Fig. 4 the performance difference
is largest in Maze worlds, moderate though significant
in 1-2-3 Worlds and smallest in Dense Worlds (p < 0.001
for Mazes and 1-2-3 Worlds, p > 0.001 for Dense Worlds).
To quantify the embodiment constraint faced in a world,
we define an embodiment index as the relative differ-
ence between the areas under the learning curves for
PIG(greedy) and the unembodied control which average
0.02 for Dense Worlds, 2.59 for Mazes, and 1.27 for 1-2-3
Worlds.
Also of particular interest, the comparison between
PIG(greedy) and random action provides further in-
sight differentiating the three classes of worlds (Fig. 4).
Whereas PIG(greedy) yielded no improvement over ran-
dom action in Dense Worlds and Mazes (p > 0.001),
it significantly improved learning in 1-2-3 Worlds(p <
0.001), demonstrating that agents benefitted from the
information-theoretic utility function only in 1-2-3
Worlds.
Greedy maximization of PIG considers only the imme-
diate gains available and fails to account for the effect an
action can have on future utility. In particular, when the
potential for information gain is unevenly distributed,
it may be necessary to coordinate actions over time
to obtain remote but informative observations. Forward
estimation of total future PIG over multiple time steps
is intractable as the number of action sequences and
state outcomes increases exponentially with time. To
guide an agent towards maximizing long-term gains of
PIG, we instead employ a back-propagation approach
previously developed in the field of economics, Value-
Iteration (VI) [8]. The estimation starts at a distant time
point (initialized as τ = 0) in the future with initial
values equal to the PIG for each state-action pair:
Q0(a, s) := IG(a, s) (14)
Then propagating backwards in time, we maintain a
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Fig. 4. Coordinating exploration using predicted information gain. The average missing information is plotted over
exploration time for greedy and value-iterated (VI) maximization of PIG. The standard control strategies and the VI+
positive control are also depicted. Standard errors are plotted as dotted lines above and below learning curves. (n=200)
running total of estimated future value by:
Vτ (s) := max
a
Qτ (a, s)
Qτ−1(a, s) := IG(a, s) + γ
∑
s′∈S
Θ̂s,a,s′ · Vτ (s′) (15)
Here, 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1, is a discount factor reducing the
value of gains obtained further in the future. When
γ < 1, backward propagation can be continued until
convergence. Alternatively, it can simply be executed for
a predefined number of steps. Choosing the latter with
γ = 1, we construct a behavioral policy (PIG(VI)) for
an agent that coordinates its actions under VI towards
maximizing PIG:
aPIG(VI) := arg max
a
Q−10(a, s); (16)
Comparing the learning curves in Fig. 4 for PIG(VI)
and PIG(greedy) in the three classes of worlds we find
that coordination of actions yielded the greatest learning
gains in Mazes, with moderate gains also seen in 1-2-
3 Worlds. In Dense Worlds PIG(VI), like PIG(greedy)
and random action, essentially reached maximal learning
performance. Along with the results for the embodiment
index above, these results support the hypothesis that
worlds with high embodiment constraint require agents
to coordinate their actions over several time steps to
achieve efficient exploration.
Convergence and optimality of the VI algorithm can
be guaranteed [8], but only if the utility function is
stationary and the true world structure is known. To
assess the impairment resulting from the use of the
internal model in VI (15), we constructed a second
positive control, PIG(VI+), which is given the true CMC
kernel Θ for use during coordinated maximization of
PIG under VI. Under this strategy, Θ is used only to co-
ordinate the selection of actions and is not incorporated
into the Bayesian estimate or the PIG utility function.
Comparing the PIG(VI) agent to the PIG(VI+) control, we
find that they only differ in Mazes, and this difference
is relatively small compared to the gains made over
random or greedy behaviors (Fig. 4). Altogether these
results suggest that PIG(VI) may be an effective strategy
employable by embodied agents for coordinating explo-
rative actions towards learning.
From the results so far the picture emerges that the
three classes of environments offer very different chal-
lenges for the exploring agent. Dense Worlds are easy to
explore. Mazes require policies that coordinate actions
over time but exhibit little sensitivity to the particu-
lar choice in utility function. 1-2-3 Worlds also require
coordination of actions over time, though to a lesser
extent than Mazes. Unlike in Mazes, however, agents
in 1-2-3 Worlds strongly benefit from the information-
theoretically derived utility function PIG.
3.4 Structural features of the three worlds
We next asked how structural differences in the three
classes of environments correlated with the above dif-
ferences in exploration performance. In particular we
considered two structural features of the worlds, their
tendency to draw agents into a biased distribution over
states and how tightly an action controls the future states
of the agent.
State bias: To assess how strongly a world biases the
state distribution of agents we consider the equilibrium
distribution under an undirected action policy, random
action. The equilibrium distribution Ψ is the limit dis-
tribution over states after many time steps. To quantify
the bias of this distribution, we compute a structure index
(SI) as the relative difference between its entropy H(Ψ)
and the entropy of the uniform distribution H(U):
SI(Ψ) :=
H(U)−H(Ψ)
H(U)
where:
H(p(s)) := −
∑
s∈S
p(s) log2(p(s))
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Fig. 5. Quantifying the structure of the worlds. (a) The
embodiment index, defined in Section 3.3, is plotted
against the structure index for each of 200 Dense Worlds,
Mazes, and 1-2-3 Worlds. (b) The average controllability,
as measured by the mutual information between an action
and a future state, is plotted as a function of the number
of time steps the state lies in the future (n=200). The error
bars depict standard deviations.
The structure index values for 200 worlds in each class of
environment are plotted against the embodiment index
(defined in section 3.3) in Fig. 5a. As depicted, the
embodiment index correlates strongly with the structure
index. Thus, the state bias seems to represent a signifi-
cant challenge embodied agents face during exploration.
Controllability: To measure the capacity for an agent
to control its state trajectory we computed the mutual
information between a random action and a future state:
MI[A0, St|s0] =
∑
a0∈A,st∈S
p(a0, st|s0) log2
(
p(st|a0, s0)
p(st|s0)
)
As shown in Fig. 5b, an action in a Maze or 1-2-3 Worlds
has significantly more impact on future states than an
action in Dense Worlds. Controllability is required for
effective coordination of actions, such as under PIG(VI).
In Mazes, where actions can significantly effect states
far into the future, agents yielded the largest gains
from coordinated actions. However, controllability, while
necessary, is not sufficient for coordinated actions to have
the potential of improving learning. For example, a non-
ergodic world might have high controllability but not
allow an embodied agent to ever reach a large isolated
set of states, regardless of whether it coordinated its
actions or not. In such a world, an unembodied agent
could reach the isolated states and thereby gain a learn-
ing opportunity inaccessible to any embodied agent.
3.5 Comparison to previous explorative strategies
While exploration in the RL literature has largely focused
on its role in reward acquisition, many of the principles
developed to induce exploration can be implemented in
our framework. In this section, we compare these various
methods to PIG(VI) under our learning objective.
Random action is perhaps the most common explo-
ration strategy used in RL. As we have already seen
in Fig. 4, random action is only efficient for exploring
Dense Worlds. In addition to undirected random action,
the following directed exploration strategies have been
developed in the RL literature. The learning curves of
the various strategies are plotted in Fig. 6.
Least Taken Action (LTA): Under LTA, an agent will
always choose the action that has been performed least
often in the current state [7], [58], [61]. Like random
action, LTA yields uniform sampling of actions in each
state. Consistently, LTA fails to significantly improve on
the learning rates seen under random action (p > 0.001
for all three environments).
Counter-Based Exploration (CB): Whereas LTA actively
samples actions uniformly, CB attempts to induce a
uniform sampling across states. To do this, it maintains
a count of the occurrences of each state, and chooses its
action to minimize the expected count of the resultant
state [71]. As shown in Fig. 6, CB performs even worse
than random action in Dense Worlds and 1-2-3 Worlds
(p < 0.001). It does outperform random actions in Mazes
but falls far short of the performance seen by PIG(VI)
(p < 0.001).
Q-learning on Posterior Expected Information Gain
(PEIG(Q)): Stork et al. [67] developed a utility function
UStorck to measure past changes in the internal model,
which they used to guide exploration under a Q-learning
algorithm [69]. Let τ be the most recent time step in
the past over which the internal model for the transition
distribution Θa,s,: changed:
τ := max{t|s(t) = s, a(t) = a, t < |~d|}
Then, considering the internal model before and after
this time step (Θ̂τ and Θ̂τ+1 respectively), and the
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Fig. 6. Comparison to previous exploration strategies. The average missing information is plotted over time for PIG(VI)
agents along with three exploration strategies from the literature: least taken action (LTA) [7], [58], [61], counter-based
(CB) [71], and Q-Learning on posterior expected information gain (PEIG(Q)) [67]. The standard control strategies are
also shown. Standard errors are plotted as dotted lines above and below learning curves. (n=200)
data collected up to this point ~dτ+1, the utility function
defined by Storck et al. is:
UStorck := DKL[Θ̂
τ+1
a,s,: ‖ Θ̂τa,s,:] (17)
Note, both Θ̂τ and Θ̂τ+1 are internal models previously
(or currently) held by the agent. In the following deriva-
tion, we demonstrate that UStorck is equivalent to the
posterior expected information gained (PEIG).
PEIG(a, s) := EΘ|~dτ+1
[
IM(Θ ‖ Θ̂τ )− IM(Θ ‖ Θ̂τ+1)
]
= EΘ|~dτ+1
[∑
s′
Θa,s,s′ log2
(
Θ̂τ+1a,s,s′
Θ̂τa,s,s′
)]
=
∑
s′
EΘ|~dτ+1 [Θa,s,s′ ] log2
(
Θ̂τ+1a,s,s′
Θ̂τa,s,s′
)
=
∑
s′
Θ̂τ+1a,s,s′ log2
(
Θ̂τ+1a,s,s′
Θ̂τa,s,s′
)
= DKL[Θ̂
τ+1
a,s,: ‖ Θ̂τa,s,:] (18)
Thus, PEIG is a posterior analogue to our PIG utility
function. Q-learning is a model-free approach to max-
imizing long-term gains of a utility function [69]. Fol-
lowing Storck et al., we tested the combination of PEIG
and Q-learning (PEIG(Q)) in our test environments. Sur-
prisingly, PEIG(Q) performs even worse, at least initially,
than random action in all three environments (p < 0.001
for CMCs and 1-2-3 Worlds, p > 0.001 for Mazes). As
such, it fails to yield the learning performance seen by
PIG(VI) in Mazes in 1-2-3 Worlds.
Altogether, Fig. 6 demonstrates that PIG(VI) outper-
forms the previous explorative strategies at learning
structured worlds. To further compare the principles
of PIG(VI) and PEIG(Q), we introduce two cross-over
strategies that borrow from each of them. The first is
PIG(Q) which applies Q-learning to the PIG utility func-
tion. The learning performance of PIG(Q) is similar to
PEIG(Q), falling short of PIG(VI) (Fig. S3). This suggests
that Q-learning is ineffective at coordinating actions
during exploration. The second cross-over strategy is
PEIG(VI) which applies the VI algorithm to Storck et
al.’s utility function. PEIG(VI) matched PIG(VI) in Mazes
(p > 0.001) but not 1-2-3 Worlds (p < 0.001), suggesting
that the posterior information gain is a reasonable pre-
dictor for future information gain under a Dirichlet prior
but not a Discrete prior.
3.6 Comparison to utility functions from Psychology
Inspired by independent findings in the field of Psy-
chology that PIG can describe human behavior during
hypothesis testing, we investigated two other measures
also developed in this context [44], [46]. Like PIG, both
are measures of the difference between the current and
hypothetical future internal models:
Predicted mode change (PMC) predicts the height dif-
ference between the modes of the current and future
internal models [6], [44]:
PMC(a, s) =
∑
s∗
Θ̂s,a,s∗
[
max
s′
Θ̂a,s,s
∗
a,s,s′ −max
s′
Θ̂a,s,s′
]
(19)
Predicted L1 change (PLC) predicts the average L1 dis-
tance between the current and future internal models
[35]:
PLC(a, s) =
∑
s∗
Θ̂s,a,s∗
[
1
N
∑
s′
∣∣∣Θ̂a,s,s∗a,s,s′ − Θ̂a,s,s′∣∣∣
]
(20)
Note, PMC and PLC differ from PIG in the norm used
to quantify differences between CMC kernels. Consider-
ing an arbitrary norm d, the claim analogous to Theorem
2 would be:∑
s∗
Θ̂currenta,s,s∗ d(Θ̂
future ‖ Θ̂current)
= Es∗,Θ|~d
[
d(Θ ‖ Θ̂current)− d(Θ ‖ Θ̂future)
]
11
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Fig. 7. Comparison between utility functions. The average missing information is plotted over time for agents that
employ VI to maximize long-term gains in the three objective function, PIG, PMC, or PLC. The standard control
strategies are also shown. Standard errors are plotted as dotted lines above and below learning curves. (n=200)
This claim states that the expected difference between
the current and future internal model equals the ex-
pected change in difference with respect to the ground
truth. While this claim holds when d is the norm used
in PIG (Theorem 2), it does not generally hold for either
of the norms used in PMC or PLC.
To our knowledge, neither PIG, PMC nor PLC have
previously been applied to sequences of observations or
to embodied action perception loops. We tested agents
that attempt to maximize PMC or PLC using VI. As Fig.
7 reveals, PIG(VI) proved again to be the best performer
overall. In particular, PIG(VI) significantly outperforms
PMC(VI) in all three environments, and PLC(VI) in 1-
2-3 Worlds (p < 0.001). Nevertheless, PMC and PLC
achieved significant improvements over the baseline
control in Mazes and 1-2-3 Worlds, highlighting the ben-
efit of value iteration across different utility functions.
Interestingly, when performance was measured by an
L1 distance instead of missing information, PIG(VI) still
outperformed PMC(VI) and PLC(VI) in 1-2-3 Worlds
(Fig. S4).
3.7 Generalized utility of exploration
From a behavioral perspective, learning represents a fun-
damental and primary drive [2], [37]. The evolutionary
advantage of such an exploratory drive likely rests on
the general utility of the acquired internal model [33],
[50], [51], [55], [56]. To test this, we assessed the ability of
the agents to use their internal models, derived through
exploration, to accomplish an array of goal-directed
tasks. We consider two groups of tasks: navigation and
reward acquisition.
Navigation: Starting at any given state, the agent has
to navigate to any given target state with the minimal
number of steps.
Reward Acquisition: For every starting state, the agent
has to gather as much reward as possible over 100 time
steps. Reward values are drawn from a standard normal
distribution and randomly assigned to every state in the
CMC. Each agent is tested in ten randomly generated
reward structures.
At several time points during exploration, the agent
is stopped and its internal models assessed for general
utility. For each task, we next derive the behavioral
policy that optimizes performance under the internal
model. The derived policy is then tested in the world
(i.e. under the true CMC kernel), and the expected path
length or acquired reward for that policy is determined.
As a positive control, we also derive an objective optimal
policy that maximizes the realized performance for the
true CMC kernel. The difference in realized performance
between the subjective and objective policies is used
as a measure of navigational loss or reward loss. High
navigational loss means the agents policy took many
more time steps to reach the target state than the optimal
policy. High reward loss means the agents policy yielded
significantly fewer rewards than the optimal policy.
Fig. 8 depicts the average rank in navigational and
reward loss for the different explorative strategy. Signif-
icance bounds (p = 0.001) around PIG(VI) were deter-
mined by post-hoc analysis of Friedman’s test [25]. In
all environments, for both navigation and reward acqui-
sition, PIG(VI) always grouped with the top performers
(p > 0.001), excepting positive controls. PIG(VI) was the
only strategy to do so. Thus, the explorative strategy
that optimized learning under the missing information
objective function gave the agent an advantage in a
range of independent tasks.
4 DISCUSSION
In this manuscript we introduced a parsimonious math-
ematical framework for studying learning-driven explo-
ration by embodied agents based on information the-
ory, Bayesian inference and controllable Markov chains
(CMCs). We compared agents that utilized different
exploration strategies towards optimizing learning. To
understand how learning performance depends on the
structure of the world, three classes of environments
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Fig. 8. Demonstration of generalized utility. For each world (n=200), explorative strategies are ranked for av-
erage navigational loss (averaged across N start states and N target states) and average reward loss (aver-
aged across N start states and 10 randomly generated reward distributions). The average ranks are plotted
with standard deviations. Strategies lying outside the pair of solid green lines differ significantly from PIG(VI) in
navigational loss. Strategies lying outside the pair of solid blue lines differ significantly from PIG(VI) in reward loss
(p < 0.0001). The different utility functions and heuristics are distinguished by color: PIG(green), PEIG(magenta),
PMC(blue), PLC(cyan), LTA(orange), CB(yellow). The different coordination methods are distinguished by symbol:
Greedy(squares), VI(circles), VI+(diamonds), Heuristic Strategies(asterisks). The two standard controls are depicted
as follows: Unembodied(black), Random(red).
were considered that challenge the learning agent in
different ways. We found that fast learning could be
achieved by an exploration strategy that coordinated
actions towards long-term maximization of predicted
information gain (PIG).
4.1 Potential limitations to our approach
The optimality of the Bayesian Estimate (Theorem 1)
and the accuracy of PIG (Theorem 2) both require a
prior distribution on the transition distributions. For
biological agents, such priors could have been learned
from earlier exploration of related environments, or may
represent hardwired beliefs optimized by evolutionary
pressures. As another possibility, an agent could attempt
to simultaneously learn a prior while exploring its envi-
ronment. Indeed, additional results (Fig. S5) show that
the maximum-likelihood estimation of the concentration
parameter for Dense Worlds and Mazes enables explo-
ration that quickly matches the performance of agents
given accurate priors. Nevertheless, biological agents
may not always have access to an accurate prior for an
environment. For such cases, future work is required to
understand exploration under false priors and how they
could yield sub-optimal but perhaps biologically realistic
exploratory behaviors.
As another potential limitation of our approach, the
VI algorithm is only optimal for dynamic processes with
known stationary transition probabilities and stationary
utilities [8]. In contrast, any utility function, including
PIG, that attempts to capture the progress in learning of
an agent will necessarily change over time. This caveat
may be partially alleviated by the fact that PIG changes
only for the sampled distributions. Furthermore, PIG
decreases in a monotonic fashion (see Fig. 2) which could
potentially be captured by the discount factor of VI.
Interesting future work may lie in accounting for the
effect of such monotonic decreases in estimates of future
learning gains.
In addition, the learning agent does not have access to
the true transition distributions for performing VI and
has to rely instead on its evolving internal model. The
impairment caused by this reliance on the internal model
was directly assessed with a positive control PIG(VI+). A
comparison of PIG(VI) against this control (Fig. 4) shows
performance impairment only in Mazes and it is rather
small compared to the improvements offered by VI.
Finally, it might be argued that the use of missing
information as a measure of learning unfairly advan-
taged the PIG utility function. Interestingly, however,
PIG under VI was not only the fastest learner, but also
demonstrated the greatest capacity for accomplishing
goal-directed tasks. Furthermore, it even outperformed
other strategies, including PLC(VI), under an L1 objec-
tive function (Fig. S4).
4.2 Related work in Reinforcement Learning
CMCs are closely related to the more commonly studied
Markov Decision Processes (MDPs) used in Reinforce-
ment Learning. MDPs differ from CMCs in that they
explicitly include a stationary reward function associated
with each transition [19], [69]. RL research of exploration
usually focusses on its role in balancing exploitative
behaviors during reward maximization. Several methods
for inducing exploratory behavior in RL agents have
been developed. Heuristic strategies such as random
action, least taken action, and counter-based algorithms
are commonly employed in the RL literature. While such
strategies may be useful in RL, our results show that they
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are inefficient for learning the dynamics of structured
worlds.
In contrast to these heuristic strategies for exploration,
several principled approaches have been proposed for
inducing exploratory actions to maximize rewards. For
example, the BEETLE algorithm models reward as a
partially observable MDP and derives an analytic so-
lution to optimize rewards [53]. Similarly, the BOSS
approach maintains a posterior distribution over MDPs
from which it periodically samples for selecting actions
that maximize reward gains ”optimistically” from the
samples [3]. These strategies focus exclusively on ex-
trinsically motivated exploration and do not address
exploration driven by learning for its own sake.
Finally, several studies have investigated intrinsically
motivated learning under the RL framework. For ex-
ample, Singh et al. [63] have demonstrated that RL
guided by saliency, an intrinsic motivation derived from
changes in stimulus intensity, can promote the learning
of reusable skills. As mentioned previously, Storck et al.
introduced the combination of Q-learning and PEIG as
an intrinsic motivator of learning [67]. In their study,
PEIG(Q) outperformed random action only over long
time scales. At shorter time scales, random action per-
formed better. Interestingly, we found exactly the same
trend, initially slow learning with eventual catching-up,
when we applied PEIG(Q) to exploration in our test
environments (Fig. 6).
4.3 Related work in Psychology
In the Psychology literature, PIG, as well as PMC and
PLC, were directly introduced as measures of the ex-
pected difference between a current and future belief [6],
[35], [44], [46]. Here, in contrast, we derived PIG, using
Bayesian inference, from the expected change in missing
information with respect to a ground truth (Theorem 2).
Analogous theorems do not hold for PMC or PLC. For
example, the expected change in L1 distance between an
internal model and the true structure is not equivalent
to the expected L1 distance between successive internal
models. This might explain why PIG(VI) outperformed
PLC(VI) even under an L1 measure of learning (Fig. S4).
We applied the PIG principle to the learning of a full
model of the world. The Psychology literature, in con-
trast, focusses on specific questions (hypothesis testing)
regarding the data. In addition, this prior literature has
not considered sequences of actions or embodied sensor-
motor loops.
It has been shown that human behavior during hy-
pothesis testing can be explained by a model that
maximizes PIG [44], [46]. This suggests that the PIG
information-theoretic measure may have biological sig-
nificance. The behavioral studies, however, could not
distinguish between the different utility functions (PIG,
PMC and PLC) in their ability to explain human behav-
ior [44]. Perhaps our finding that 1-2-3 Worlds give rise
to large differences between the three utility functions
can help identify new behavioral tasks for disambiguat-
ing the role of these measures in human behavior.
Itti and Baldi recently developed an information the-
oretic measure closely related to PEIG for modeling
bottom-up visual saliency and predicting gaze attention
[5], [29], [30]. In their model, a Baysian learner maintains
a probabilistic belief structure over the low-level features
of a video. Attention is believed to be attracted to loca-
tions in the visual scene that exhibit high Surprise. Like
PEIG, Surprise quantifies changes in posterior beliefs by
a summed Kullback-Leibler divergence. Several poten-
tial extensions of this work are suggested by our results.
First, it may be useful to model the active nature of
data acquisition during visual scene analysis. In Itti and
Baldi’s model, all features are updated for all location
of the visual scene regardless of current gaze location or
gaze trajectory. Differences in accuity between the fovea
and periphery however suggest that gaze location will
have a significant effect on which low-level features can
be transmitted by the retina [74]. Second, our comparison
between the PIG and PEIG utility functions (Figs. 6 and
S3) suggests that predicting where future change might
occur, may be more efficient than focusing attention only
on those locations where change has occured in the past.
A model that anticipates Surprise, as PIG anticipates
information gain, may be better able to explain some
aspects of human attention. For example, if a moving
subject disappears behind an obscuring object, viewers
may anticipate the reemergence of the subject and attend
the far edge of the obscurer. Incorporating these insights
into new models of visual saliency and attention could
be an interesting course of future research.
4.4 Information-theoretic models of behavior
The field of behavioral modeling has recently seen
increased utilization of information-theoretic concepts.
These approaches can be grouped under three guiding
principles. The first group uses information theory to
quantify the complexity of a behavioral policy, with high
complexity generally considered undesirable. Tishby and
Polani for example, considered RL maximization of re-
wards under such complexity constraints [73]. While
we did not consider complexity constraints on our be-
havioral strategies in the current work, it may be an
interesting topic for future studies.
The second common principle seeks to maximize pre-
dictive information [4], [66], [72] (not to be confused with
predicted information gain, PIG). Predictive informa-
tion, which has also been termed excess entropy [14],
estimates the amount of information a known variable
(or past variable) contains regarding an unknown (or
future) variable. For example, in simulated robots, Ay
et al. demonstrated that complex and interesting behav-
iors can emerge by choosing control parameters that
maximize the predictive information between successive
sensory inputs [4]. The information bottleneck approach
introduced by Tishby et al. [72] combines predictive
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information and complexity constraints, maximizing the
information between a compressed internal variable and
future state progression subject to a constraint on the
complexity of generating the internal variable from sen-
sory inputs. Recently, Still extended the information
bottleneck method to incorporate actions [66].
Both Ay et al. and Still describe the behaviors that
result from their models as exploratory. Their objective
of high predictive information selects actions such that
the resulting sensory input changes often but in a pre-
dictable way. We therefore call this form of exploration
stimulation-driven. Predictive information can only be
high when the sensory feedback can be predicted, and
thus stimulation-driven exploration relies on an accurate
internal model. In contrast, the learning objective we
introduced here drives actions most strongly when the
internal model can be improved and this drive weakens
as it becomes more accurate. Thus, learning-driven and
stimulation-driven exploration contrast each other while
being very interdependent. Indeed, a simple additive
combination of the two objectives may naturally lead to
a smooth transitioning between the two types of explo-
ration, directed by the expected accuracy of the internal
model. In the next section we suggest a correspondence
of these two computational principles of exploration
with two distinct modes of behavior distinguished in
psychology and behavioral research.
Finally, the Free-Energy (FE) hypothesis introduced by
Friston proposes that the minimization of free-energy, an
information-theoretic bound on surprise, offers a unified
variational principle for governing both the learning
of an internal model as well as actions [17]. Friston
notes that under this principle agents should act to
minimize the number of states they visit. This stands in
stark contrast to both learning-driven and stimulation-
driven exploration. During learning-driven exploration,
an agent will seek out novel states where missing infor-
mation is high. During stimulation-driven exploration,
an agent will actively seek to maintain high variation
in its sensory inputs. Nevertheless, as Friston argues,
reduced state entropy may be valuable in dangerous
environments where few states permit survival. The
balance between cautionary and exploratory behaviors
would be an interesting topic for future research.
4.5 Towards a general theory of exploration
With the work of Berlyne [11], Psychologists began to
dissect the complex domains of behavior and motiva-
tion that comprise exploration. A distinction between
play (or diversive exploration) and investigation (or
specific exploration) grew out of two competing theories
of exploration. As reviewed by Hutt [27], ”curiosity”-
theory proposed that exploration is a consummatory
response to curiosity-inducing stimuli [9], [42]. In con-
trast, ”boredom”-theory held that exploration was an
instrumental response for stimulus change [20], [43]. To
ameliorate this opposition, Hutt suggested that the two
theories may be capturing distinct behavioral modes,
with ”curiosity”-theory underlying investigatory explo-
ration and ”boredom”-theory underlying play. In chil-
dren, exploration often occurs in two stages, inspection
to understand what is perceived, followed by play to
maintain changing stimulation [28]. These distinctions
nicely correspond to the differences between our ap-
proach and the predictive information approach of Ay
et al. [4] and Still [66]. In particular, we hypothesize
that our approach, which emphasizes the acquisition of
information, corresponds to curiosity-driven investiga-
tion. In contrast, we propose that predictive information
a la Ay et al. and Still, which rehearses the internal
model in a wide range, may correspond with play.
Further, the proposed method of additively combining
these two principles (Section 4.4), may naturally capture
the transition between investigation and play seen in
children during exploration.
Even in the domain of curiosity-driven exploration,
there are many varied theories [37]. Early theories
viewed curiosity as a drive to maintain a specific level
of arousal. These were followed by theories interpret-
ing curiosity as a response to intermediate levels of
incongruence between expectations and perceptions, and
later by theories interpreting curiosity as a motivation
to master one’s environment. Loewenstein developed an
Information Gap Theory and suggested that curiosity is
an aversive reaction to missing information [37]. More
recently, Silvia proposed that curiosity is composed of
two appraisal components, complexity and comprehen-
sibility. For Silvia complexity is broadly defined, and in-
cludes novelty, ambiguity, obscurity, mystery, etc. Com-
prehensibility appraises whether something can be un-
derstood. It is interesting how well these two appraisals
match information-theoretic concepts, complexity being
captured by entropy, and comprehensibility by infor-
mation gain [49]. Indeed, predicted information gain
might be able to explain the dual appraisals of curiosity-
driven exploration proposed by Silvia. PIG is bounded
by entropy and thus high values require high complexity.
At the same time, PIG equals the expected decrease
in missing information and thus may be equivalent to
expected comprehensibility.
All told, our results add to a bigger picture of explo-
ration in which the theories for its different aspects fit
together like pieces of a puzzle. This invites future work
for integrating these pieces into a more comprehensive
theory of exploration and ultimately of autonomous
behavior.
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Fig. S1. Example Dense World. Dense Worlds consist of 4 actions 
(separately depicted) and 10 states (depicted as nodes of the graphs). The 
transition probabilities associated with taking a particular action are depicted 
as arrows pointing from the current state to each of the possible resultant 
states. Arrow color depicts the likelihood of each transition.
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Fig. S2. Example 1-2-3 World. 1-2-3 Worlds consist of 3 actions 
(separately depicted) and 20 states (depicted as nodes of the 
graphs). The transition probabilities associated with taking a particu-
lar action are depicted as arrows pointing from the current state to 
each of the possible resultant states. Arrow color depicts the likeli-
hood of each transition. The absorbing state is depicted in gray.
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Fig. S3. Comparison between different features of current and previous exploration strategies. The Average missing infor-
mation is plotted over time for agents that apply either VI (circles) or Q-learning (triangles) towards maximization of either 
PIG (green) or PEIG (magenta). Standard control strategies are also shown. Standard errors are plotted as dotted lines 
above and below learning curves. (n=200)
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Fig. S5. Inferring the concentration parameter during learning. Maximum Likelihood estimatation 
of the concentration parameter, α, is performed from data collected during exploration. A maxi-
mum concentration of α=20 is imposed. (a,b) The mean error in inferred concentration parameter 
over time is plotted for Dense Worlds and Mazes. (c,d) The missing information for a PIG(VI) 
explorer updating its internal model using the true (green with circles) or inferred (purple with 
stars) over time is plotted for Dense Worlds and Mazes. Standard control explorers (with α given) 
have been included. Dotted lines above and below learning curves depict standard errors. Notice, 
even when required to infer the appropriate concentration parameter, the explorer is still able to 
quickly learn an accurate internal model.
